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IF IT IS BROKEN, THEN FIX IT: NEEDED REFORMS TO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: 2009 ANNUAL MEETING

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS SECTION
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
Professor Melissa Hart*: Today's panel reflects an extremely
diverse group of papers. I will just say a little bit about each of the speakers
and what they are going to talk about.
Minna Kotkin is from Brooklyn Law School, where she runs the
employment law clinic. She writes extensively in the area of employment
discrimination law. She is considering the counter-intuitive problem that
some plaintiffs, who have multiple protected categories within their
identity, experience multi-forms of possible discrimination and who are
therefore different from other plaintiffs, may have a harder time with their
cases than those who have fewer differences.
Joe Steiner, from South Carolina Law School, is examining the
Supreme Court's decision in the Twombly' case, which held that pleadings
must set forth sufficient facts to state a plausible or reasonable claim. He
considers what impact that rule has had already on employment
discrimination claims and proposes an alternative to that rule.2
Professor Roberto Corrada, of the University of Denver College of
Law, author of several casebooks and an active participant in our
community, has proposed an integrated framework for consideration of
religious discrimination claims, looking at how direct discrimination claims
and accommodation claims should be considered together.
Deborah Widiss, who is a Visiting Professor at Brooklyn Law School,
is presenting a paper that also won the AALS Scholarly Paper Award this
year. She is examining the ways that courts narrowly interpret
congressional overrides of judicial decisions in the employment
discrimination area and how that creates what she calls shadow precedents,
Supreme Court decisions that have been overridden but still continue to
play an important role in the way the law develops.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Professor Steiner's presentation is not being published as part of the AALS Program of the
Section on Employment Discrimination Law because his article, dealing with the subject matter of his
presentation, is being published by the law review at the University of Illinois College of Law.
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Minna Kotkin*: Today's topic is what is wrong with current
employment discrimination law, and I am going to talk about its successes
and failures. The workplace is now American society's most diverse
atmosphere, far surpassing neighborhoods or schools. 3 The antidiscrimination laws certainly have created positive change. But it is well
recognized that there is still a good share of discrimination in the
workplace.4 My thesis, simply put, argues that this discrimination is largely
directed at the "complex claimant": 5 workers who face bias because they
are different in multiple ways. Put another way, these workers fall within
more than one of the protected categories: older women of color or older
workers with disabilities, for example. Employers may now accept or even
embrace a certain amount of diversity, but the complex claimant still faces
stereotypical thinking and judicial hostility.6 Empirical evidence
demonstrates that cases involving complex claimants are much more likely
to be unsuccessful in the courts than those that assert only a single claim of
bias. As Melissa said, this is somewhat counter-intuitive and I am going to
explore some of the reasons for this situation.
I want to begin with a review of employment discrimination law's
standard critique. We know from experience and empirical studies that
plaintiffs disproportionately lose in the courts. One group of scholars has

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For a fuller discussion of the themes discussed in
this presentation, see Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination:A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM.

& MARY L. REV. 1439 (2009).
3. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L. J. 1, 8 (2000) ("Since the enactment of Title VII, the workplace has become a comparatively
integrated social environment - compared, that is, to other places in which adult citizens interact with
each other." (emphasis in original)).
4. See Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment DiscriminationLitigation as a ClaimingSystem, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 663 (2005).
5. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479 (1994).
6. See Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (referring in dissent to multiples claims as a "rather common tactic," citing the following
cases: Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996) (alleging race, national origin,
gender, and age discrimination); Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank of N.J., No. 95-5603, 1996 WL
589189 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 1996); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (including age,
religion, and retaliation); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996) (including race,
age, and gender); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (alleging age, gender, and retaliation);
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Ser. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996), (including age and
gender); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (involving
gender and disability); Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir. 1996) (alleging age, gender, and
national origin discrimination); Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995) (including age, gender,
and national origin); Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (involving age and gender);
Johnson v. Off. of Sen. Fair Emp. Practices, 35 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (including gender and
religion); Dashnaw v. Pena, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 12 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (including
age, national origin, religion, and race); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1993)
(involving age and gender)).
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pointed to the prevalence of "unconscious racism," 7 "negligent
discrimination," 8 and "implicit bias." 9 They make the claim, that the nature
of discrimination has changed to become more subtle and less easily
identified,'o and our laws and litigation techniques are too crude a vehicle
by which to address it.
A second critique is that the system is inherently biased in how it
processes discrimination cases. For example, there are those who point to
"plaintiff phobia,"" a trend that all employment discrimination litigators
are well aware of. It is a result of a more conservative judiciary and a
reaction to the so-called litigation explosion.
Finally, the "structuralist"1 2 school of scholarship draws from both
these critiques and concludes that the courts are not equipped to identify or
remedy the kind of discrimination that exists today. They argue that we
must analyze and reform the workplace's inherent regulatory mechanisms
in order to root out current forms of discrimination.
My narrative of what's wrong with our discrimination laws does not
challenge these critiques as a general matter. However, I suggest that for
the complex claimant, discrimination remains not so subtle. For example,
the stereotypes for women may have loosened, but the stereotypes for older
African American women or older women with serious illnesses are very
much still in play. You can create any number of combinations, but the
more protected characteristics that you pile on, the more likely there is
discrimination and the less likely you are to win your case.
In an article that explores these themes in depth, I address the

&

7. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
8. David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993). For other
excellent explorations of this theme, see Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva
La Evoluci6n! Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000).
9. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006) ; Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 969, 978-88 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action, " 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
10. I use the term "subtle" rather than "unconscious" bias, because it more accurately reflects
workplace practices and keeps within the framework of the anti-discrimination laws, as Michael Selmi
notes. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination:A Matter of Perspective Rather Than Intent, 34
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657 (2003); see also Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J.
1129 (1999) (arguing that negligent discrimination should not be actionable).
11. See Kevin M. Clermont, LitigationRealities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919 (2009).
12. Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer
Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007); Susan Sturm, Second GenerationEmployment Discrimination:A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). For a summary of this literature, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-11
nn. 10-32 (2006).
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doctrinal basis for addressing complex claims, which begins with the "sex
plus analysis." 3 I also talk about intersectional scholarship,1 4 particularly
the works of Kim Crenshaw1 5 and Kathryn Abrams,1 6 which were
instrumental in introducing the notion of complex claimants to the courts. I
will skip these discussions today. Instead, I will focus on the growth of
complex claims and how they fare in the court. I will also offer some
suggestions for better resolution of these claims.
Many of you probably know that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) statistics track not only the number of charges filed,
but also the number of claims made, thereby providing some evidence of
the number of multiple claims. I analyzed the EEOC dataset starting with
1993, when the Civil Rights Act of 199117 and the ADA were in full force,

to compare the ratio of charges to claims. The following graph shows the
growth of charges to claims in a clear upward trajectory:

13. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination:A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1439, 1463 (2009),
14. Id. at 1481.
15. Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139.
16. Abrams, supra note 5, at 2517-40.
17. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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This trend is even more pronounced when court filings are analyzed.
In a yet unpublished study, Laura Beth Neilson reviewed 1314 employment
discrimination case files, and found that only 31 percent of discrimination
cases asserted a single ground for discrimination. 8
Figure 2:

What happens to these claims in the courts? This is somewhat difficult
to determine. We have a number of datasets and statistical studies on
win/lose rates for plaintiffs and defendants, some of which analyze the
results by race, sex, and other statutory bases. However, these studies do
not code for multiple claims and therefore are not particularly helpful. In
order to obtain some limited empirical data, I analyzed a year's worth of
age/gender claims and race/gender claims in the federal district courts for
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. I found twenty-six
substantive decisions. Of those, only one multiple claim survived the
summary judgment stage: 3.8 percent of the sample. The Federal Judicial
Center's recent study found that 27 percent of plaintiffs prevail at the

&

18. Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating
Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States, RESEARCHING LAW
(American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL.), Spring 2008, available at <http://www.americanbar
foundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/rlspring08.pdf.>; see also generally Laura Beth Nielson
Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An EmpiricalAnalysis ofEmployment DiscriminationLitigation as
a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663, 687 (2005).
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summary judgment phase.' 9 So when we compare the two studies, we find
that multiple claimant cases have a dramatically lower rate of success.
Obviously, this is a very small sample but it certainly bore out my
anecdotal impression of what happened to these cases.
Why do complex claimants fare so poorly? First, there is a significant
problem with the EEOC intake questionnaire that claimants file as the first
step in pursuing a remedy for discrimination. The questionnaire reads:
Do you believe this action was taken against you because of: (Check the
one(s) that apply and specify your race, sex, age, religion or ethnic
identity.)
o RACE o SEX o RELIGION o NATIONAL ORIGIN o AGE
" RETALIATION o COLOR o DISABILITY o OTHER, EXPLAIN
BRIEFLY:

20

Claimants almost always appear in the EEOC office without a lawyer
at this stage, 2 1 and will likely check those boxes that apply to them. This is
the genesis of the multiple claim problem. Pro se litigants, uneducated
about discrimination law and often without clear explanation for their
termination or other adverse employment action, have little information
upon which to base their claim and often assume that it is due to a number
of their personal traits.
Then these cases take on a life of their own. They proceed through the
EEOC and to the federal courts, either pro se or with a lawyer, but are
bound for failure. Because lawyers loathe to drop claims before discovery
commences, they may hold on to them much longer than they should. At
the summary judgment phase, judges fail to engage in any detailed
consideration of the intersectional nature of discrimination. One judge went
as far as saying that multiple claim cases are like "throwing spaghetti at the
wall." 2 2 When judges see a race/sex/age case, they view the litigant as a

19. Federal Judicial Center Memorandum, Estimates of Summary Judgment Activity in Fiscal
Year 2006, at 9-10 tbl. 4 (Apr. 12, 2007), available at <http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf>; see also Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary
Judgment Practicein Six FederalDistrict Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 884-88 (2007).
20. EEOC Intake Questionnaire Form 283. For a discussion of this process, see Holowecki v. Fed.
Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008); see also Laurie M. Stegman,
Note, An Administrative Battle of the Forms: The EEOC's Intake Questionnaire and Charge of
Discrimination,91 MICH. L. REV. 124 (1992).
21. See Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) ("EEOC charges
frequently are filled out by employees without the benefit of counsel . . "); Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d
1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We recognize that employees often file an EEOC charge without the
assistance of a lawyer and we therefore read the charge liberally.").
22. Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for Dismissal,
Summary Judgment, 19 EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. (BNA) 595 (Dec. 4, 2002) (quoting federal District
Court Judge Ruben Castillo of the N.D. Ill., who criticized plaintiffs' lawyers "for filing wide-ranging
claims alleging discrimination on multiple levels - a strategy akin to 'throwing a plate of spaghetti at
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crank just trying to get any claim to stick.
There are also evidentiary problems with the litigation of multiple
discrimination claims. The first is the difficulty of finding comparators. For
many complex claims, the evidentiary pool is too small to find the
appropriate statistical, anecdotal, or "me too" evidence that is needed to
demonstrate pretext.23 One illustrative case is Jeffers v. Thompson,2 4 which
involved a black fifty-five-year-old woman who was working in a very
small bureau of the Medicaid office at the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). She was up for a promotion but didn't get it and
claimed race, gender and age discrimination. The court looked at nineteen
employees who had already been promoted to similar positions and among
them found two African American women, two white women, and one
older male. From this, the court determined there was no discrimination.
The plaintiff was the only older African American woman among the seven
qualified candidates under consideration, but as long as the employer could
point to individuals from each of the asserted categories, the court was
satisfied that the employer did not discriminate.
Here, better evidence may have come from looking at the entire
Medicaid bureau of HHS. Unfortunately, courts' reluctance to grant broad
discovery in many of these cases creates a problematic barrier. The
interesting thing about Jefferies was that the court openly acknowledged
that the more specific the composite class the more onerous the burden of
25
persuasion. Lawyers and claimants do not normally recognize this and, as
a result, bring multiple claims too readily. For these cases to have any
possibility of success, a wide evidentiary pool is needed.
The second evidentiary issue is the lack of social science data and
expert testimony relating to the complex and nuanced stereotypes that these
kinds of claimants are subject to the workplace. There has been interesting
work done in this area and it is meeting with some success in the so-called
"maternal wall" cases. For example, Joan Williams and her institute have
put together a huge body of social science data relating to the stereotypes
against women with children. 2 6 They established the Cognitive Bias
the wall to see what sticks"').
23. See Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that evidence showing an
employer's previous discriminatory conduct in the form of "me too" evidence from a prospective
witness would be relevant and thus admissible in a Title VII discrimination case and holding that
whether this information was more probative than prejudicial must be decided case by case and based
on the circumstances of the individual plaintiff).
24. 264 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D. Md. 2003).
25. Id. at 327.
26. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate
Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS & EMP. POL'Y J.
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Working Group of the Program on Work-Life Law, which met over a twoyear period with social scientists, law professors, and practitioners and
developed a body of data on prevalent stereotypes and a list of experts that
can be used in cases. These discrimination cases are finally being
successfully litigated.27
My final recommendation is that we need to do the same kind of
research for some of the other classifications that come up frequently, such
as older women, older women of color, and people with age claims related
to disabilities. These classifications also bring to mind nuanced stereotypes
that require more social science data and expert testimony.
Professor Roberto Corrada*: I would like to thank Melissa Hart for
putting this panel together and I want to briefly mention that we celebrated
in Colorado this year because Amendment 46, which was the equivalent of
Proposition 209 in California, was defeated and a large reason for that was
Melissa Hart's work as the lead attorney and co-chair in the "No on 46"
campaign. Regardless of what you think about affirmative action, that
amendment was deceptive as we learned in that campaign, and Melissa led
the charge. A large part of the reason for the success was simply educating
people that the amendment was not a civil rights amendment in the
traditional sense of the word. The fact that the message got out was I think
one of the reasons that the amendment was defeated. So Melissa Hart, great
work.
My article is about the confluence of disparate treatment and
accommodation in religion cases. What happens when some evidence of
bias shows up in an accommodation context? In the article that I wrote,
which is going to be forthcoming in the Cincinnati Law Review 28 but is
available right now on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 29 I
isolate three different mixed discrimination/accommodation cases. A case
that you are probably not familiar with, that I was involved in, is Reed v.
FAA. 30 Two cases that you might be familiar with, and are in a number of

401 (203); see also, Symposium: Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using
Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination,7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 287 (2003).
27. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003), where a plaintiff's supervisor
admitted that although the plaintiff was qualified, he did not consider her for the promotion because she
had children and he assumed she did not want to relocate her family. She was awarded over a million
dollars in damages, later reduced.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
28. Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate Treatment and Accommodation
Frameworkfor Title VII Religion Cases, 77 CINCINNATI L. REv. 1411 (2009).
29. It can be downloaded from <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=960171>.
30. 438 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2006).
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casebooks, are Brown v. Polk County3 1 and Wilson v. U.S. West
Communications.3 2 All three are mixed disparate treatment and
accommodation cases.
Probably my paper should have been titled, "A Funny Thing
Happened to Me When I Tried an ACLU Case," rather than the title it has.
Because of the time, I will talk today primarily about only one of the cases,
the Reed case, and briefly mention Brown and Wilson after that. Don Reed
was an air traffic controller in Pueblo, Colorado. I was chair of the ACLU
legal panel in Colorado when the ACLU agreed to take his case, because of
the nature of the case. He was religious, a Sabbatarian, and had a
fundamental belief that he should take the Sabbath off, and his Sabbath was
Saturday. He had been accommodated for seven years in his job and then
suddenly was fired after not being accommodated. Usually when somebody
is accommodated for that long a period of time it means that the employer
really doesn't have a problem accommodating the person. So, in fact, when
I got into the case, I quickly found as I suspected, and as is true in so many
of these cases, that what happened was a new supervisor showed up who
had a problem with the challenge to authority that came from the
accommodation, and the first thing that he did was to take Don Reed out of
the position called Quality Training Supervisor (QATS) which was a
position that was outside of the normal seniority bidding system, with the
person working the normal five days a week as a schedule. So even though
he had little seniority, he did not have to engage in bidding and was
accommodated for seven years.
Joe Hof, the supervisor, said that the position should not be privileged
that way, even though it was not a much sought after position and nobody
had an issue with it going to Don. Then, in addition, Hof proceeded to
apply intense scrutiny to Don's religion. He often asked questions like,
"exactly what type of emergency would it take to get you in here on a
Saturday" - those sorts of questions. And one time Hof actually yelled at
Don, because Don had taken a flight back on a Saturday, that his religion
was a "scam." So there was some decent direct evidence of religious
discrimination in the case.
But clouding the bias in this case were the issues of accommodation.
After he was taken out of the QATS position Don had to bid, and he had
low seniority and it was a seven-day facility. It is an air traffic control
facility and he wasn't senior enough to get Monday through Friday on his
own. The air traffic facility was unionized and he worked with some very
31. 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
32. 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
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creative union folks to set up various swaps and coverage changes with
other controllers and that worked for a couple of years. Then he was fired,
and mainly the problem was that the air traffic control facility started to
lose staffing. Once you lose staffing, the swaps become tougher.
We pled the case as a disparate treatment case and, in the alternative,
as an accommodation case. We had evidence on both so we pled that way.
Before the FAA Administrative Law Judge, we were pretty successful with
respect to the evidence on both sides. We had lots of evidence of bias; we
also had evidence that there were some accommodations that had not been
made that could have been made, including putting him in the QATS
position, which had no specific prerequisite or requirement.
The ALJ apparently felt that all that bias stuff is sort of thorny and
messy, and the accommodation issues were much more straightforward,
and saw that we could win the case on accommodation. So he gave us the
victory on the accommodation theory, finding it unnecessary to reach bias.
Of course we were really upset because if an ALJ finds bias that is much
tougher to overturn on appeal. Accommodation is much more technical, so
we felt somewhat vulnerable on appeal, especially in this process. The
appeal was to the Merit System Protection Board in Washington, D.C.,
which does not often grant oral argument. We weren't granted oral
argument, and they reversed. They found that a number of accommodations
that had been provided were reasonable and that the FAA did what it
needed to do, and that was all there was to it. They focused only on the
accommodation claim since nothing had been done with the bias issue.
Now this was a federal employee and so you get two bites at the
apple. So my wife, who is a litigator, then took the case straight into federal
district court de novo and she won a $2.25 million jury verdict. The jury
clearly seemed to dislike the supervisor Joe Hof, and that might explain the
money. Of course, with caps, the award was taken down to $1 million but
the jury found both that there was disparate treatment based on bias and
also failure to accommodate. There was an appeal to the Tenth Circuit, and
the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court on the bias claim. But
interestingly, the FAA defended the bias claim on appeal by arguing it had
offered reasonable accommodations and that was its only obligation. I
scrambled to find something that said you can't use a reasonable
accommodation defense in a bias case and I found nothing that said that, it
being such an obvious proposition. Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not
have a problem, and upheld the bias case, but it bothered me. One minor
goal of my article was simply to have something plaintiffs could cite that
said you couldn't borrow from one framework in a different framework
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case. That proposition alone is fairly uncontroversial and I like to think that
I did something useful just having that in a law review article.
There are two concerns with this type of case. The first one was the
AU deciding that he didn't want to bother with one part of the case, bias,
and went instead with accommodation. Ideally, a judge would see the
evidence and find that there was a violation on both counts, but he decided,
perhaps, that this was a winner and he did not want to have to mess with
bias because it would be a longer opinion. I haven't seen a lot of cases
where those kinds of decisions are explicitly made, but I suspect that those
kinds of things happen and they may show up in other more subtle ways.
For example, a judge may spend more time writing the accommodation
part of the case. So that was one thing that bothered me, this idea that
judges have the discretion to choose which framework to go with, and their
thinking might be that the damages are more or less similar, in
accommodation versus bias cases.
The second thing that bothered me was the FAA borrowing a defense
from one framework and arguing that defense in another framework.
Actually, unless you understand the structure of Title VII, that by itself
does not sound unreasonable, to say we offered a reasonable
accommodation. The statute requires that. How could there be a problem?
Now if you know something about Title VII, you understand that there are
two separate ways to go, and I will talk very quickly about the other two
cases that I discuss in the article.
The Brown case was brought by a man who was a supervisor in a
county government.33 He was fired, in part, because he brought his religion
into the workplace. He had a bible and, among other things, he required his
secretary to type up his bible study notes.34 He lost in the district court
because the district court judge found it was an accommodation case; the
accommodation framework is much more favorable to employers and so
Brown lost. 3 5 The case went up on appeal and the Eighth Circuit said not
only was it a disparate treatment case, not simply an accommodation case,
but it was a mixed motive case.36 The evidence of religious bias was so
strong because one of the reasons he was fired was explicitly because he

33. Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
34. Id. at 1309. Brown also held Bible study and prayer meetings, and quoted the Bible in support
of his encouragement to subordinates to maintain a strong work ethic.
35. Id. at 1314.
36. Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654-57 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (reasoning that
the reprimand given to Brown was a refusal to accommodate his religious practices and so if it was
unreasonable, the termination based in part on that reprimand was disparate treatment on the basis of
religion).
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brought religion into the workplace. The court did not even remand the
case; it decided it right there, mixed motive, he wins.37
The other case, the Wilson case, is very interesting. It has been written
about a lot and involves an anti-abortion button.3 8 The woman who sued
US West had a fairly large anti-abortion button with a picture of a fetus and
it was the picture of the fetus that apparently was a huge problem. 39 That
case probably was rightly decided. It was tricky because again the district
court judge viewed it as an accommodation case and the employer
presented three options for accommodation, 1) cover the button, 2) allow
just the language of the button without the picture of the fetus, and 3) no
button at all. 40 So the court said there were reasonable accommodations
offered. 4 1 A couple of other problems with the case were, first, that the
court felt that her religious belief was different from what she said it was.42
Again, this was on summary judgment so that kind of finding at summary
judgment has been criticized. But the part of the case that bothers me the
most was that there was a lot of hostility by co-workers related to the
button. Because this was a summary judgment accommodation case, that
hostility was not fleshed out the same way it would have been if the court
had followed a McDonnell Douglas or mixed motive type of framework to
deal with bias evidence. The judge handled the bias question on the side,
basically, and part of the opinion says I just do not think there was any bias
here 43 - again, an accommodation case handling bias on the side. And it
bothers me because I think, who knows, if she had not had a religious
reason but just was upset about a miscarriage and maybe had a button with
a picture of a fetus, something like that but not religious, she might not
have faced the same kind of hostility. In other words, it is unclear in that
case where the hostility was coming from. I am not saying that case was
wrongly decided. It just bothers me that the evidence of hostility was not
handled properly and I think one of the reasons for this was that the judge
37. Id. at 657.
38. Wilson v. U.S. West Commc'n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).

39. See id. at 1338-39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1339, 1341-42.
1341-42.
1340-41.
1341. The court stated,
Moreover, U.S. West did not oppose Wilson's religious beliefs, but rather,
was concerned with the photograph. The record demonstrates that U.S. West did not
object to various other religious articles that Wilson had in her work cubicle or to
another employee's anti-abortion button. It was the color photograph of the fetus
that offended Wilson's co-workers, many of whom were reminded of circumstances
unrelated to abortion. Indeed, many employees who opposed Wilson's button
shared Wilson's religion and view on abortion.
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framed the case as an accommodation case and then had no reason to focus
on the bias evidence in a rigorous way.
What do we make of all this? I first looked at the legislative history of
the 1972 accommodation amendments to see if I could find anything about
the interplay between discrimination/bias and accommodation. After 1964,
the EEOC realized that a lot of religion claims are accommodation claims,
but the 1964 statute explicitly said discrimination because of religion. So
EEOC issued a regulation, 1605. 1(b) in 1967 requiring accommodation of
religious practice.4 That was overturned on the basis that the 1964 statute
required bias and only if there was discrimination could you mandate an
accommodation for religious practice.4 5 That is why the 1972 amendments
were required - to mandate that neutral, well-meaning employers also had
to accommodate. And so to me the accommodation framework should only
be available to neutral, well-meaning employers. In other words, if there is
evidence of bias in a case, that changes the entire dynamic, and this is
important because the accommodation framework is very employer
friendly. It is much easier for employers to win accommodation cases than
straight-up bias cases. 46
I briefly considered whether I should argue for a disparate
treatment/accommodation framework for religion cases. In other words,
accommodation cases that have evidence of bias, as a separate category,
but I dismissed that option because it increases the potential for
misclassification. Remember, one of the issues is that the ALJ or judge
may say, "Oh this is an accommodation case and we will only deal with it
that way," as the ALJ actually did in the Reed case, and ignore bias
evidence. Also, framework borrowing, mixing elements from different
types of cases, could actually increase if there are three rather than two (or
better, one) frameworks. So I essentially set out to think about an integrated
or uniform framework.
With only one framework for Title VII religious claims, judicial
discretion is severely minimized as all religion cases are treated the same
way. Here is the way a single or unified framework would operate. One,
the employee must establish that he or she has a sincerely held belief or
practice that did or did not conflict with a work requirement. Two, the
employer knew or had reason to know of the belief or practice. And three,
the employee suffered an adverse employment action. That would set out a
44. 42 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1967).
45. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided
court 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam).
46. See Karen Engle, The PersistenceofNeutrality: The Failureofthe Religious Accommodation
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REv. 317, 321 (1997).
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prima facie case by the employee. At this point, the framework would
essentially follow a McDonnell Douglas or mixed motive framework. The
employer would now either have to show that it would have taken the same
action regardless or it would have to give a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason, and that could be attacked by the plaintiff on pretext grounds. That
handles any bias in a traditional bias framework. At that point, if the
employer survives the bias challenge, if there is no accommodation
component in the case, the case is dismissed. If, however, there is an
accommodation angle in the case then you proceed to the accommodation
case. So, were reasonable accommodations offered or was there an undue

hardship?
The idea here is that every religion case has to be treated the same,
which means judges have little discretion; they have to strain any evidence
of bias through a bias framework first, before getting to accommodation.
The bottom line here is judicial discretion is limited by forcing
consideration of all angles of the evidence to ensure that the easier
accommodation framework for employers is only accessed by wellmeaning or neutral employers and minimizes misclassification errors. In
other words, you handle the bias first, if it exists, and it is only when the
employer survives the bias challenge that the case proceeds into an
accommodation analysis. And, finally, this reduces the mischief vis-a-vis
strategic uses of parts of alternative frameworks; a practice I call
"framework- borrowing" which I hope does not become popular. Thank
you.
Deborah Widiss*: Thank you. This paper, Shadow Precedents and
the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional
Overrides,4 7 provides an interesting counter-point for some of the issues the
other panelists have discussed. If you think the doctrine being developed in
the cases they've discussed is not right, the response is basically, "Well, go
to Congress and have it overridden." In this paper, I am looking at the
effectiveness of overrides (that is, statutory amendments that supersede
judicial interpretations of a statute). I identify particular statutory
interpretation questions that arise when courts must interpret overrides,
focusing on the relationship between the override and the precedent that it
is superseding. And what I have found is that courts often continue to rely
on the overridden precedent, a phenomenon that I call relying on a "shadow

* (formerly) Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; currently Associate
Professor, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
47. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretationof CongressionalOverrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 511 (2009).
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precedent."
I should be clear that in most of the cases that I analyze in the paper,
courts do not ignore the fact that an override has been enacted. But it is not
apparent how a court should decide a new factual scenario that arises under
a statute if the new scenario is in some sense relevantly similar to the issue
addressed in the precedent case - and would pretty clearly be governed by
the precedent case but for the override - but is not squarely addressed by
the text of the override itself. In that situation, you see courts saying
everything from, "Oh, yes, the override functionally erases that precedent
entirely," to "No, no, it is a narrow exception to the rule announced in the
precedent case, and Congress of course intended and acquiesced in our
ongoing use of the precedent in every context not directly addressed by the
override."
The examples that I use in the paper are all pulled from employment
discrimination law. In the paper, I talk more generally about the
significance of overrides in the separation of powers, but for this
discussion, I am going to focus on how we see reliance on shadow
precedents shaping employment discrimination doctrine. One recent
decision where this issue is quite prominent is the Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. 48 case. Ledbetter has since been overridden itself, as I
discuss briefly in a post-script added to this transcript. The issue in
Ledbetter was, when does the statute of limitations begin to run for a pay
discrimination claim? Was it when Lily Ledbetter had a discriminatory
evaluation several years in the past, or did it restart with each new pay
check that she received? As you all know, in a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court held that the limitations period began to run when she had
the discriminatory evaluation in the past. 49 The majority decision relied
very heavily on Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,so where the issue had
been, when does the statute of limitations begin to run to challenge a
seniority system? In Lorance, the Court had held that it began to run when
the seniority system was put into place, not later when its effects were
felt.5 1 The Ledbetter majority opinion's reliance on Lorance would be

unremarkable except that Lorance had been overridden. Two years after
Lorance was decided, Congress amended Title VII to state that the statute
of limitations to challenge a seniority system may run from when an
individual is injured by the application of a seniority system, even if that is

48. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
49. Id. at 621.
50. Lorance v. A T & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).

51. Id. at 913.
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long after the seniority system is put into place.5 2 The dissent in the
Ledbetter case, written by Justice Ginsburg on behalf of four justices,
argued that the majority was wrong to rely on Lorance because it was
overridden.5 3 The dissent contended that the override should be understood
as entirely superseding Lorance and its rationale and that it was a clear
signal from Congress that it agreed with the dissent in Lorance. But the
Ledbetter majority responded to this whole argument in a footnote, saying
the override of Lorance just concerned seniority systems and that the
amendment has no relevance in the larger proposition set forth in the
majority opinion in Lorance.54 It's that dichotomy and confusion that I am
looking at in the paper.
Let me give you one other example, which in some sense I think is
even more surprising. This is a group of recent cases in which courts rely
on GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert.55 Gilbert is an infamous decision; when
you teach it, students can't believe that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not recognized as sex discrimination. But in Gilbert, the
Court reasoned that because the employer's insurance policy did not
identify any condition for which men were covered and women were not,
but rather simply excluded a single condition - pregnancy - that happened
to only affect women, there was not any sex discrimination.5 6 Congress, as
you all know, overrode Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which defined sex under Title VII as "including but not limited
to pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition." 57 If you go back to
the committee reports and statements made by sponsors in enacting the
PDA, Congress was quite clear that it disagreed with the analysis that the
Court had used in Gilbert.5 Congress instead agreed with the dissents in
Gilbert that had argued that Title VII, as initially enacted, should have been
recognized as sufficient to address the problem: if you discriminate on the
basis of a characteristic that is unique to one sex or the other, that should
have been recognized as sex discrimination. 59 This is what all the courts of
appeals had held and what the EEOC had held prior to Gilbert.6 0
Obviously, there are debates about looking at legislative history when
52. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2006)).
53. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 653-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 627 n.2.

105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (1991)

55. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 136-40.
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2; S. Rep. No. 95-33 1, at 2-3 (1977).
AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1974 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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doing statutory interpretation. The nice thing about this example is that the
Supreme Court itself has looked at this legislative history when interpreting
the PDA. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, " which
was decided shortly after the PDA was enacted, the Supreme Court relied
on this legislative history to state that the PDA was enacted to make clear
that Congress disagreed with the result in Gilbert, and further that Congress
disagreed with the test of discrimination that was used in Gilbert and that
Congress indicated that it agreed with the dissents in Gilbert.62 So it is

quite clear the Supreme Court has already understood that the PDA was
intended to completely override Gilbert.
Notwithstanding that, you still see courts relying on Gilbert as binding
precedent. In the paper, I look at cases currently bubbling up in the lower
courts being brought by women who allege they have been discriminated
against at work based on choosing to breastfeed or expressing breast
milk.63 Courts have consistently held that these employees cannot state a
Title VII claim. The reasoning that courts use is as follows. They start with
the text of the PDA and say it's not pregnancy, it's not childbirth, and it's
not a related medical condition (you might quibble on the last point, but
they have been consistent in saying that the PDA's reference to "medical
conditions" only applies to conditions directly tied to pregnancy - because
women can choose not to breastfeed, breastfeeding is not directly enough
tied to pregnancy).6 4 Then courts say that there is no way to distinguish the
breastfeeding cases from Gilbert: it is a condition that is unique to one sex
and therefore they are bound by Gilbert. Thus, they hold there is no sex
discrimination. What I am arguing in the paper is that this is an
inappropriate way of looking at the question. I think that, given the
override, courts should be doing a fresh statutory analysis of what Title
VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of sex" means, rather than
simply adopting the Court's interpretation in Gilbert, since it was clearly
repudiated by Congress.
The whole issue raises some significant separation of powers issues,
which I go into in detail in the paper. For now, let me just say that in each
of the examples I use, there was very good legislative history suggesting

61. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
62. Id. at 676.
63. See Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wallace v. Pyro
Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (analogizing to Gilbert), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th
Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision) (neither approving nor disapproving of the district court's
analysis regarding Gilbert).
64. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869; see also Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding that breastfeeding is not a "medical condition" under the PDA).
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that Congress expected and intended the enactment of the override to be
sufficient to end reliance on the precedents. So when courts continue to rely
on the overridden precedents, the overrides are not playing the role that
they are expected to play in terms of ensuring legislative supremacy (that
is, that Congress is the ultimate arbiter of statutes and statutory meaning).
Also, without getting into too much detail, reliance on these shadow
precedents doesn't actually serve the values that are typically served by
reliance on precedent. Precedent is usually justified as ensuring that similar
cases are being treated similarly and as promoting efficiency and
predictability in the law. Where you have courts relying on these shadow
precedents, you have similar cases being treated differently without any
affirmative indication from Congress that it intended those differences. Nor
is it predictable; courts are all over on how they resolve these issues. Nor is
it efficient.
After discussing these problems, I try to think about what an
appropriate response would be. There are two obvious possibilities. One is
that Congress should be doing something different in the way it drafts
overrides. The other is that courts should be doing something different in
the way they interpret overrides. I think both are true. Often, when I talk
about this paper, people's first response is: Well, just put the onus on
Congress. If courts resolve these issues in an ad hoc and unpredictable way,
have a rule that an override will always be interpreted narrowly. That rule
will be information forcing in that Congress will have to make clear exactly
how much it disagrees with the precedent. Congress will have to make
those judgment calls in statutory language that passes both houses of
Congress and is signed by the President.
I think Congress would be well served to think about these questions
more when it drafts overrides. Congress should be as clear as possible
about the extent to which it disagrees with the underlying rationale of a
decision that it is overriding. But I do not think that the responsibility to
address the interpretive puzzles posed by overrides should rest solely with
Congress.
I have two different concerns. One is a practical one that this simply
would be an unreasonable burden to place on Congress. This is most
clearly illustrated by a third kind of "shadow precedent" scenario that I talk
about in the paper, which arises when you have one statute that is
interpreted and other statutes that borrow that interpretation. For example,
if courts have interpreted language in Title VII a given way, they will
borrow those interpretations when interpreting similar language in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Age Discrimination in
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Employment Act (ADEA). I look at the issue as it arises with respect to
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.65 The particular question is whether the
standard regarding mixed-motive claims as expressed in Price Waterhouse
should continue to govern interpretation of the ADA and the ADEA,
notwithstanding that Price Waterhouse's mixed motive analysis as applied
to Title VII was overridden in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As you probably
know, the Supreme Court just granted certiorariin a case that raises that
issue pretty directly (the decision in that case, Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, is discussed briefly in a post-script at the end of this transcript).6 6
The Court has also skirted around the issue of whether Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio 67 should apply to these other statutes, as well as
whether Lorance should apply to these other statutes. In Smith v. City of
Jackson,6 8 the Court stated, with no real analysis, that Wards Cove applies
to the ADEA; later, it backed away from that statement a little bit in
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,69 but it has not ever really
struggled with what it would mean to require that Congress amend each
and every other one of these statutes to end reliance on an overridden
precedent.
A rule that requires Congress to amend all of these other statutes
would place a considerable burden on Congress. That is part of the reason
why I do not believe that the answer to the interpretive challenges posed by
overrides should be entirely that Congress just needs to draft overrides
differently. Notably, Title VII is not a model just for the ADA and the
ADEA. It is used in interpreting Title VIII, Title VI, Title IX and a whole
host of other employment statutes. To suggest that Congress needs to
amend each and every one of those other statutes to end reliance on an
interpretation of Title VII with which it disagrees would place an enormous
burden on Congress and make the possibility of an effective override of an
interpretation far less accessible.
A similar issue arises if you think back to the discussion of the scope
of an override as relates to substantive questions, as in the override of
Gilbert or Ledbetter. Again, many would suggest that Congress just needs
to be clear in statutory language that it disagrees with the interpretative
rationale of the case. There are cases you can imagine where that would be
relatively simple. Gilbert is one. Congress could have drafted something

65. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
66. Gross v.
67. 490 U.S.
68. 544 U.S.
69. 126 U.S.

FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
642 (1989).
228 (2005).
2395 (2008).
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that says if you discriminate on the basis of a characteristic that is unique to
one sex or the other, that is sex discrimination. You can imagine statutory
language like that, but if you think about a lot of cases and the multiple
sorts of rationales that led to the results, it's harder to imagine. It would
lead to very cluttered statutes.
My other concern with simply placing an onus on Congress to draft
overrides "more clearly" is that it doesn't answer the question of how
Congress signals that it disagrees with the interpretation of the language
that was already in the statute - for example, that "because of sex" really
should be interpreted as itself having been sufficient to reach pregnancy
without the addition of the specific reference to pregnancy in the PDA. For
both of these reasons, I advocate in the paper that courts also should change
the way they interpret overrides. I am proposing that they should do a fresh
statutory interpretation, not only of the text of the override but of the preexisting statutory language, with a rebuttable presumption against relying
on the prior judicial interpretation.
Obviously, this is not to say Congress couldn't pass a narrow override;
it could generally codify the approach taken in a case and then carve out an
exception. What my proposal would do is shift the presumption that is
associated with congressional silence regarding some other potential
application of the interpretative rationale. Currently, such "silence" is often
assumed to be acquiescence to the ongoing application of an overridden
case; under my proposal, such "silence" would be presumed to be
disapproval of the ongoing application of the overridden case. I would just
add very briefly that there are two limitations on the proposal. First, it
would not apply to constitutional adjudication by the courts; to the extent
that the Court has narrowly interpreted a statute or struck it down on
constitutional grounds, the Court's constitutional reasoning would remain a
fully binding precedent even if Congress subsequently enacted an override.
Second, it would not be relevant to aspects of the precedent that were
unrelated to the override.
Postscript: Shadow Precedents Applied:
Gross v. FBL FinancialServices
The AALS panel occurred in January 2009, six months before the
Supreme Court decided Gross v. FBL FinancialServices. 70 Since Gross
directly relates to the issues that are addressed in my paper, I thought I
70. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
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would add a few brief thoughts on the approach that the Supreme Court
took in Gross.
In Gross, the Court struggled with the specific question I explore in
my paper: What significance should be accorded to the fact that Congress
specifically overrode Price Waterhouse's analysis of mixed-motive claims
by amending Title VII but that it did not at the same time amend the
ADEA? As a brief reminder, in Price Waterhouse, four justices joined a
plurality opinion that interpreted the Title VII's prohibition on
discrimination "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or national origin to
mean that a showing that sex (or another protected criteria) was a
"motivating" factor in an employment decision would be sufficient to shift
the burden to the employer to justify the action;71 Justice White and Justice
O'Connor each separately concurred, but interpreted the language as
requiring a showing that sex was a "substantial" factor. 72 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence is typically considered to provide the holding for
the case. Three justices dissented, arguing that a plaintiff should have to
prove that sex was the "but-for" cause of the decision.73 Congress cleared
up the issue with respect to Title VII by amending the statute to largely
codify the plurality's interpretation, while also adding an affirmative
defense (the amendments are considered an override because they
supersede Justice O'Connor's interpretation).74
The confusion arose because Congress did not amend the ADEA, the
ADA, or other discrimination statutes that include the same "because of'
language. Courts therefore have struggled when faced with mixed-motive
claims under these other statutes. Prior to Gross, most held that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse should govern interpretation
of these other statutes. A few reinterpreted the language in these other
statutes in line with the Congressional amendments of Title VII. 7 6 No one
followed the roundly-rejected dissent in Price Waterhouse - until the
Supreme Court's decision in Gross.77

&

71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 279-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(m) , -5(g)(2)(B) (2006)).
75. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 526 F.3d 356, 361-62 (8th Cir. 2008); Glanzman v.
Metropolitan Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004); EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co.,
364 F.3d 160, 164 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 208 F.3d 1303, 1305
n.2 (1 Ith Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
76. See, e.g., Fast v. S. Union Co., 149 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying the "motivating
factor" standard enacted in the 1991 CRA).
77. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354-55 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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In a five-to-four decision, reflecting the common conservative-liberal
split, the Court interpreted the "because of' language in the ADEA as
requiring a showing that the illegitimate criterion is a "but-for" cause of the
decision.7 8 The Court justified its disregard of the 1991 amendments by
noting that Congress had amended Title VII but not the ADEA, 7 9 although,
as Justice Stevens points out in dissent, there is persuasive legislative
history suggesting Congress intended the amendments to apply to the
ADEA as well.o
At first blush, this may seem reasonable. Why shouldn't we expect
Congress to amend the ADEA along with Title VII? The problem with this
resolution is that there's no limiting principle. It's not too difficult for
Congress to draft language that supersedes a statutory interpretation in the
particular context of the precedent with which it disagrees. But it is quite
difficult for Congress to anticipate every statute and every situation where
such an overridden precedent might be deemed relevant.
The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,8 1 the first statute signed into law by

President Obama, is a good example of how hard it is for Congress to
amend all relevant statutes. The Act was an override of Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire, which, as discussed above, concerns the statute of
limitations for pay-related claims under Title VII. 8 2 Congress clearly tried
to anticipate and resolve the problem of how the override would relate to
other similar statutes. In addition to amending Title VII, the Fair Pay Act
also amends the comparable provisions in the ADEA and specifies that it
will apply to claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973; it makes these changes retroactive to the day before Ledbetter was
decided.83 But even this has not been enough to end reliance on the Court's
repudiated holding. A recent district court case, Maher v. International
Paper Co., 8 4 while noting correctly that the Act amends all of these other
statutes, held that Ledbetter remains "persuasive authority except where
overruled by statute" - and applied it to a claim brought under the Family
and Medical Leave Act. In other words, it applies Ledbetter as a shadow
precedent. (The scope of the Fair Pay Act as related to Title VII is also
open to question, and courts are already also struggling with how the
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2350 n.3.
Id. at 2355-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).

82. Id. § 2.
83. Id. §§ 3-6.
84. 600 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
85. Id. at 950 n.5.
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Ledbetter Fair Pay Act affects the precedential value of Ledbetter in noncompensation-related claims.) 8 6
As discussed in the remarks recorded above, in my paper, I advocate
an alternative approach to better allow overrides to play their expected role
in preserving the separation of powers. Although I agree that Congress
would be well-served by drafting overrides to head off some of these
issues, I also argue that courts should adopt interpretive conventions that
are more respectful of the significance of the override. Specifically, I
propose that enactment of an override should create a rebuttable
presumption that the prior judicial interpretation of the pre-existing
statutory language is superseded, and that courts should therefore do
"fresh" interpretation of the language. But, importantly, rather than
deeming Congress's "failure" to amend the ADEA free license to adopt the
Price Waterhouse dissenter's interpretation of Title VII, an interpretation
that Congress clearly rejected, the Court should, I believe, have
reinterpreted the language in the ADEA in line with the interpretation
Congress endorsed in Title VII: that is, that a plaintiff may succeed in a
claim by showing that age was a motivating factor in the decision.

86. E.g., Darensburg v. Metropolitan Trans. Comm'n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1041-42 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (considering whether Ledbetter Fair Pay Act affected the continuing violation/discrete act
distinction for non-compensation injuries).

